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This paper develops an analytical framework to investigate the relationship between water 
and armed conflict, and applies it to the ‘Summer War’ of 2006 between Israel and Lebanon 
(Hezbollah). The framework broadens and deepens existing classifications by assessing the 
impact of acts of war as indiscriminate or targeted, and evaluating them in terms of international 
norms and law, in particular International Humanitarian Law (IHL). In the case at hand, the 
relationship is characterised by extensive damage in Lebanon to drinking water infrastructure 
and resources. This is seen as a clear violation of the letter and the spirit of IHL, while the 
partial destruction of more than 50 public water towers compromises water rights and national 
development goals. The absence of pre-war environmental baselines makes it difficult to gauge the 
impact on water resources, suggesting a role for those with first-hand knowledge of the hostilities 
to develop a more effective response before, during, and after armed conflict.
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Introduction
This paper has two objectives: (i) to present an analytical framework that can serve 
to interpret the breadth and the depth of the relationship between water and armed 
conflict; and (ii) to employ this framework in an exploration of the ‘Summer War’ of 
2006 between Israel and Lebanon (Hezbollah). The ‘analytical framework of water 
and armed conflict’ is based on the authors’ experience of implementing water projects 
throughout the world, as well as on the water conflict chronology classification devel-
oped by Gleick (2011). This classification is first broadened by expanding water infra-
structure and resources to encompass water institutions and trans-boundary water 
conflict, and then deepened through characterisation of the nature of the damage 
resulting from acts of war (discriminate or indiscriminate) according to interna-
tional norms. The latter include principles of environmental justice, the Human Right 
to Water, International Humanitarian Law (IHL), International Water Law (IWL), 
the Law of Belligerent Occupation (LBO), the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), and the developing concepts of warfare ecology, ‘ecocide’, and ‘environmen-
tal crime’. In other words, the framework appreciates that the water–war relationship 
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is mediated by the motives and the means of the combatants who wage war, and 
the politicians who choose war, as well as by more distantly engaged lawyers and 
social activists. 
 The Summer War of 2006 provides an interesting case with which to develop and 
test the framework, in part because of the long history of instability in the region. 
A century of armed struggle to define the borders of Lebanon, Israel, and British 
Mandate Palestine has not spared water infrastructure and resources (see Zeitoun et 
al., 2012, Table 5.3). The archival record explored suggests a direct relation between 
the changing nature of warfare and the type and extent of water-related damage. The 
bulk of destruction in the warfare of the 1940s was the product of ground opera-
tions or artillery combat, for instance, whereas the damage experienced in the 1980s 
was due primarily to air strikes (especially during the Israeli invasion of Beirut, 
Lebanon, in 1982). The war of 2006, fought by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and 
Lebanon’s armed Hezbollah political party and militia, may be viewed as the latest 
episode in a process that is evolving only in terms of the quality of documentation. 
 The 33-day (12 July–14 August 2006) war had an immense impact on public 
mental health, the economy (Eid-Sabbagh, 2007), and regional stability (Achcar and 
Warschawski, 2007). Arguments have been made that it also established a new combat 
doctrine of ‘disproportionality’—that was used to even harsher effect three years 
later in Gaza (Goodman, Menuchin, and Oron, 2009)—claiming the lives of more 
than 1,000 people and injuring more than 4,000 others (mainly civilians). The war 
was fought principally with aircraft, artillery, and tanks by the IDF, and with anti-
tank weapons and artillery by Hezbollah. Most of the ground combat occurred in 
South Lebanon, although the Israeli Air Force also struck further north (notably in 
Beirut and the Beka’a Valley). As will be seen, the magnitude and the type of damage 
to water infrastructure, institutions, and resources on both sides of the border reflects 
directly the means of war.
 The water–war relationship is explored using the ‘analytical framework of water 
and armed conflict’, which is developed in the following section. The paper then 
investigates the impact of the war on Lebanese public water reservoirs, and on the 
Lebanon–Israel conflict over the upper reaches of the Jordan River. The analysis reveals 
that the destruction of water and wastewater infrastructure is a clear violation of 
the letter and the spirit of IHL, that the damage to public water reservoirs also is a 
violation of the Human Right to Water, and that the Jordan River conflict is of 
negligible relevance. Two methodological challenges are identified: 
• the difficulties of gauging impact in the absence of pre-war environmental base-
lines; and 
• the need for first-hand observation and knowledge of hostilities to assess the char-
acter of the damage. 
 The study concludes by recommending a role for humanitarian actors before, 
during, and after an armed conflict. 
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Understanding water and war and developing the 
analytical framework
In one sense ‘water’ may be considered as a subset of the ‘war–environment rela-
tionship’ that Pearson (2012, p. 116) describes from a historical landscape perspective. 
The body of research on the reproducing relationship between war and water is slim, 
however, compared with geography and political ecology research into more ‘loot-
able’ natural resources (see, for example, Le Billon, 2001). While international water 
conflicts—whether violent (Gleditsch et al., 2006) or non-violent (Zeitoun and 
Warner, 2006)—have attracted significant attention, the work is limited to explora-
tion of water resources as a goal of conflict. Water as a target, victim, or weapon of war 
has been scrutinised much less. As Peluso and Vandergeest (2011) argue with respect 
to forests, water is a highly politicised (and securitised) resource (see also Julien, 2012), 
and this relationship deserves considerably more attention. 
 The subsequent sections review relevant research from the overlapping categories 
of international environmental and water norms, and international environmental 
and water law. The term ‘water’ is used loosely here to denote water resources, water 
infrastructure, water institutions, and hydro-politics. ‘War’ is somewhat compro-
mised shorthand for ‘armed conflict’, although the latter is retained where there is 
a direct bearing on international law. 
International water norms relevant to access, equity, and sustainability
The most established norms relevant to water and war have their origins in the 
development of thinking on social justice, as set out by Rawls (1971), Sen (2009), and 
many others. From this vast field of thought come at least two important principles: 
equitable distribution of harm and benefits; and retribution for past harm. Research 
on environmental justice has replicated social justice’s reach into history to consider 
the future—and raises concerns for inter-generational justice, primarily through the 
notion of environmental sustainability (see, for example, Schlosberg, 2004; Hiskes, 
2006). The quest for justice is expected to have considerable relevance for conflict 
resolution efforts that address the root causes of water conflicts. 
 The norms derived from social justice thinking sit alongside those developed by 
the bureaucracies and activists in the sphere of international development, notably 
the 2015 MDGs and water rights. Both of these are centred around access to safe 
drinking water, with MDG 7 Target 10 calling, for instance, for the halving of the 
proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water by 2015. The 
Right to Water is codified in General Comment 15 of the 2002 International Cov-
enant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), while the Human Right 
to Water was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in Resolu-
tion A/RES/64/292 of 26 July 2010, although not without opposition. These norms 
of equitable distribution, retribution, access, and sustainability for future generations 
are also reinforced directly and indirectly by various instruments of international law. 
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International law relevant to the impact of armed conflict on water 
infrastructure 
Research on the effects of war on water infrastructure has been led primarily by 
humanitarian aid agencies and practitioners. Water engineers have documented the 
impact of war on water infrastructure from Afghanistan to Angola (Nembrini, 2001, 
2002), and highlighted the difficulties of partnering in external reconstruction efforts 
(Pinera and Reed, 2009). The Water and Habitat Department of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is arguably the leading organisation in this field 
(see ICRC, 1994, 2000, 2009).
 The Department for International Law and Cooperation of the ICRC is exploring, 
furthermore, the limits of IHL—or the ‘Geneva Conventions’—and protection of 
the environment in times of armed conflict (ICRC, 2010), building on the work of 
the United Nations Environment Programme—as the United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has done for infrastructure (UN-OCHA, 
2012). Tignino (2010) discusses the relevance of Article 52 (1) of the Geneva Convention’s 
Additional Protocol I,1 which calls for the ‘protection of civilian objects which are not 
military objectives’ by combatants. Based solidly on the tenet of non-discrimination 
(Pejic, 2001), Article 54 (Para. 2) and Article 55 of the same Protocol call for the 
‘protection of the natural environment’ and ‘objects indispensable to the survival 
of the civilian population’ during times of armed combat (ICRC, 1994; see also 
Hulme, 2010; Rieu-Clarke, Moynihan, and Magsig, 2012, Table 6.2). Destruction 
of civilian water infrastructure in times of war is also considered to be a violation of 
the right to an adequate standard of living, as stated in the ICESCR (Article 11(1)),2 
as well as in the UNGA’s Human Right to Water (Tignino, 2011), and in the United 
Nations Watercourses Convention (UNWC) of 1997 (McCaffrey, 2007)—the latter 
is discussed in greater detail below.
 In a similar way, the LBO states that the civilian population of territory occupied 
by an army ‘must benefit from the maximal safeguards feasible in the circumstances’ 
(Mason, 2011, p. 1), which extends to drinking and irrigation water infrastructure.3 
Stein’s (2011) path-breaking work on ‘waterfare’ pushes the variety of laws to the 
limits, by linking the use of water as a weapon of war and exploring further the con-
nections between the LBO, IHL, and IWL. 
International law and concepts relevant to the impact of armed conflict 
on water resources and trans-boundary water sharing 
The body of norms that have been developed concerning the impact of armed con-
flict on water resources is just as varied as the norms for water infrastructure. Flaws 
in the letter and the implementation of environmental law led in 2010 to a push by 
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the United Nations Inter-
regional Crime and Justice Research Institute for the legislation of ‘environmental 
crime’ (Higgins, 2010). This may be the expression of a long-held (if abandoned) idea 
for the eradication of ‘ecocide’ (see, for example, Falk, 1973). With future generations 
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and environmental sustainability in mind, ecocide seeks to make ‘extensive damage 
to, destruction or loss of ecosystem(s)’ a ‘5th crime against peace’ (Eradicating Ecocide 
Global Initiative, 2012). With fresh water as the lifeblood of all terrestrial ecosystems, 
armed conflict that damages water resources clearly would fall into this category or 
be an ‘environmental crime’. 
 This developing body of environmental law can expect to face the same obsta-
cles that confront all elements of international law (including lack of enforceability, 
capacity, and documentation), of course, as well as the additional challenge of a lack 
of an ‘environmental baseline’. The issue is highlighted by post-war ecological studies 
of UNEP’s investigation in Darfur, Sudan, of the relation between desertification 
and the fighting between government troops and militias (UNEP, 2007b), as well as 
by the environmental degradation caused by the Israeli attacks on Gaza in 2009 (UNEP, 
2009). The challenge sparked the development of ‘warfare ecology’ by Machlis and 
Hanson (2008), who call for a more rigorous approach, meaning ecological evalu-
ations at different stages of warfare (that is, during pre-war preparations, wartime, 
and post war).4 This would involve investigations at the local level to identify the 
destruction of crops and arable land, biodiversity loss, deforestation, and tactical oil 
spills. Post-war studies are advised to scrutinise long-term alterations in land use, bio-
diversity conservation in buffer zones, and long-term groundwater pollution (Machlis 
and Hanson, 2008). 
 Perhaps the most developed body of law on water resources is IWL. Developed 
from customary law (thus based on observation of state practice), IWL has been codi-
fied in a number of different instruments, notably the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (UNECE)’s Water Convention of 1992, the developing Draft 
Aquifer Articles of the International Law Commission, and the UNWC. Two of the 
three main principles of the UNWC are of direct relevance to this paper: ‘no signifi-
cant harm’ calls for the minimisation of the impact of one state’s activities on water 
resources in another state, while ‘equitable and reasonable use’ is the primary prin-
ciple invoked for fair distribution of water resources between states (McCaffrey, 2007). 
 Of course, protection accorded to water infrastructure and water resources by 
these laws and norms during armed conflict remains, on the whole—as in the case 
at hand—theoretical. Not all parties consent to the norms, and international law 
cannot be readily enforced. A second equally important weakness is their blindness 
to the effect and influence that war can have on the management of water resources, 
or on trans-boundary water conflicts. One should note that wars can ravage formal 
and informal institutions (Cramer, 2006), just as they may be waged in (usually very 
small) part for the control of water resources (Allan, 2001).
The analytical framework of water and armed conflict 
The ‘analytical framework of water and armed conflict’ presented here seeks to fill 
these gaps in research, and to employ elements of each aspect of international envi-
ronmental norms and laws. It builds on the ‘basis of conflict’ in the Water Conflict 
Chronology (Gleick, 2011), which is used to classify war and water events from hydro-
political and military strategic perspectives, as shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Water Conflict Chronology definitions
Key terms
Control of water resources (state and non-state actors): where water supplies or access to water is at the root of tensions.
Military tool (state actors): where water resources, or water systems themselves, are used by a nation or a state as a 
weapon during a military action.
Political tool (state and non-state actors): where water resources, or water systems themselves, are used by a nation, 
state, or non-state actor for a political goal.
Military target (state actors): where water resource systems are targets of military actions by nations or states.
Terrorism (non-state actors): where water resources, or water systems, are either targets or tools of violence or coercion 
by non-state actors. 
Development disputes (state and non-state actors): where water resources or water systems are a major source of con-
tention and dispute in the context of economic and social development.
Source: Gleick (2011).
 While the Water Conflict Chronology itself has been widely cited, there are few, 
if any, cases of direct application of the ‘basis of conflict’. Its brief application to the 
2006 Summer War has revealed a number of shortcomings, including, most impor-
tantly, the lack of reference to any international norms, or consideration of institu-
tions or politics. There is also some duplication in the categories: ‘terrorism’, for 
instance, is distinguished from ‘military tool’ and ‘military target’ not by consequence 
of action but by the subjectively defined legitimacy of the actors responsible for the 
damage (actions carried out by a state are classed as a ‘military tool’ whereas those 
conducted by non-state actors are termed ‘terrorism’).5 Finally, the classification dis-
counts possible interpretation of the purpose of the acts, whether indiscriminate or 
discriminate. While intentionality may be difficult to prove, it is directly related to 
the nature of the attacks and thus to IHL, and is certainly of relevance to aspects of 
environmental justice and to conflict resolution efforts. 
 A much broader frame has been developed by Donnelly et al. (2012), in relation 
to water risks to businesses during times of war. Usefully, it distinguishes between 
the primary and the secondary impacts of hostilities. The ‘analytical framework of 
water and armed conflict’ shown in Table 2 reflects this broadening, and allows for 
deeper investigations by grounding impacts in international environmental norms 
and laws. The framework is built on the authors’ humanitarian experience of assist-
ing local authorities in supplying water and repairing water infrastructure during 
and following armed conflict throughout Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.6 
 The most relevant international environmental norms, laws, and concepts are sug-
gested in the right-hand column of Table 2. The left-hand column suggests a guide 
with which to evaluate the character of the damage, with ‘indiscriminate damage’ 
defined as that arising from indiscriminate attacks, which IHL prohibits and defines 
as being ‘those which are not directed at a specific military objective’ (Henckaerts 
and Doswald-Beck, 2005, Rule 12), and which are akin to ‘collateral damage’. 
‘Discriminate damage’ is defined here as that arising from attacks with specific military 
Mark Zeitoun, Karim Eid-Sabbagh, and Jeremy Loveless 28 
Table 2. Analytical framework of water and armed conflict
Character Description Example Norms/law/
concepts
Armed conflict and water infrastructure
Indiscriminate Damage owing to indiscriminate  
attacks on water infrastructure that 
disrupts the flow of water sources or 
access to them by non-combatants 
(that is, the water infrastructure is 
not the main target). 
• Manholes or fire hydrants crushed 
by normal heavy equipment traffic.
• Distribution network pipes 
crushed (where exposed).
• Main or transmission lines cut off 
or dug up as part of a road, with 
the intention of disrupting traffic.
• Random shrapnel or bullet dam-
age to public water reservoirs or 
rooftop tanks.
• Any of the above suffered during 
general destruction of urban  
neighbourhoods. 
IHL, LBO,  
‘waterfare’,  
‘urbicide’,  
human rights 
and other rights 
to water
Discriminate Damage owing to targeted attacks 
on water infrastructure that disrupts 
the flow of water sources or access 
to them by non-combatants (that is, 
water infrastructure is the target).
• Manholes or fire hydrants crushed 
when off-road, or by diggers.
• Buried distribution network pipes 
crushed or cut-up (where buried).
• Main or transmission lines cut-off 
or dug up.
• Piercing of storage structures 
(such as public water reservoirs or 
rooftop tanks).
• Looting of water-treatment facilities.
• Damage to supporting structures 
(such as electrical networks and 
water-treatment supply lines). 
• Destruction of household reservoirs 
and large dams, for instance. 
Armed conflict and water resources
Indiscriminate Short- or long-term impact owing to 
indiscriminate attacks, leading to 
reduced quantity and quality of  
water resources (that is, water  
resources are not the target).
• Contamination of surface or ground-
water due to oil spills from military 
staging stations, for example.
• Contamination resulting from 
damage to oil reservoirs, petrol 
stations, and power transformers, 
inter alia. 
• Seepage from untreated waste-
water when plants abandoned for 
security reasons.
Environmental 
crime, ecocide, 
warfare ecology, 
environmental 
and social justice, 
IWL
Discriminate Short- or long-term impact owing to 
targeted attacks, leading to reduced 
quantity and quality of water resources 
(that is, water resources are the target).
• Contamination of surface or ground-
water resulting from tactical oil spills. 
• Destruction of crops and arable 
land; seepage of untreated waste-
water following destruction of 
wastewater treatment plants. 
• Poisoning of water sources.
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Character Description Example Norms/law/
concepts
Armed conflict and water sector institutions/development
Indiscriminate Indirect impact on water-sector insti-
tutions or development projects and 
plans, including ‘opportunity costs’. 
• Water development infrastructure 
or institutional projects and plans 
halted for security reasons.
• Lost opportunities because of  
donor reluctance to reinvest. 
• Damaged or stolen administrative 
records. 
• Water bills unpaid (or disruption 
in billing services). 
• Further breakdown of infrastruc-
ture owing to decreased operations 
and maintenance–such as lack of 
spares or staff (due to the security 
situation).
• ‘Brain-drain’, as skilled staff leave 
the country. 
Environmental 
and social  
justice, MDGs, 
human rights 
and other rights 
to water
Discriminate Direct impact on water-sector institu-
tions, or development projects and 
plans.
• Targeted destruction of projects 
under construction. 
• Replacement of local decision-
makers with those from the  
occupying army.
• Reduction of capacity of mainte-
nance crews.
Armed conflict and trans-boundary water conflict/cooperation
Indiscriminate Impact of indiscriminate attacks, 
leading to worsening technical or 
political relations over existing trans-
boundary water arrangements.
• Cessation of joint trans-boundary 
projects owing to a breakdown in 
or a lack of trust at the broader 
political level. 
• Violations of agreed treaties. 
• Establishment of coercive trans-
boundary water ‘cooperative’ 
mechanisms.
IWL, environ-
mental and  
social justice
Discriminate Impact of attacks directed at specific 
military objectives, leading to wors-
ening technical or political relations 
over existing trans-boundary water 
arrangements. 
• Military damage to upstream 
trans-boundary water resources  
or infrastructure to prevent with-
drawals or diversions.
• Military activity leading to the 
creation or maintenance of an 
inequitable distribution of water 
resources. 
• Acquisition of territorial control 
(and so direct control over trans-
boundary water resources).
• Targeted contamination of down-
stream trans-boundary water  
resources.
Source: authors (based on Zeitoun (2005); Gleick (2011); Donnelly et al. (2012)).
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objectives, signifying intentional or targeted destruction (and so relates to the ‘tool’ 
and ‘target’ aspects of the framework of Gleick (2011)). IHL’s distinction of com-
batants and non-combatants is also made use of in the more specific definitions.
Water and war during the 2006 Summer War
This section applies the ‘analytical framework of water and armed conflict’ to the 
2006 Summer War on both sides of the Israel–Lebanon border. 
Water and war in Israel in 2006
The 2006 Summer War claimed the lives of 43 Israeli civilians and 119 soldiers, and 
injured 690 and displaced between 300,000 and 500,000 people. Hezbollah launched 
around 4,000 surface-to-surface (‘Katyusha’, and other) rockets, 901 of which landed 
in urban areas. More than 6,000 homes were hit, some 2,000 of which were com-
pletely destroyed. The direct and indirect cost of the war in Israel has been estimated 
at USD 1.6 billion (Israel Project, 2011).
 Apart from public documents, the extent of the damage has been investigated in 
private interviews and unpublished reports, provided primarily by the ‘water file’ 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and by the Director of International Relations 
of the Ministry of Environmental Protection. The documentation show how the 
wastewater infrastructure suffered the bulk of the war damage.
 Perhaps the most dramatic impact of the war on the environment was the destruc-
tion of about 1,300 hectares (12,000 dunums) of forest and woodland by fire. The 
Ministry of Environmental Protection also reported that the wastewater treatment 
plant (WTP) in Safad ‘suffered direct damage to the sludge treatment facility, to the 
pipes and to adjacent buildings’ (IMEP, 2006). Approximately 14,000 cubic metres 
of sludge from the Naharia WTP was dumped in the sea, owing to a ‘lack of suf-
ficient security facilities’, as the plant was (presumably) evacuated during the war. 
Furthermore, biogas was either burned off or released—because of incomplete con-
struction, or a lack of maintenance during hostilities—from three WTPs, including 
some 700,000 cubic metres from the Haifa WTP, 100,000 cubic metres from the 
Karmiel WTP, and 70,000 cubic metres from the Naharia WTP (IMEP, 2006). 
 Given the limited accuracy of the Katyusha and other missiles used by Hezbollah, 
the damage may be classified as ‘indiscriminate’, according to the analytical frame-
work of water and armed conflict, and a violation of the relevant clauses of IHL. 
The long-term ecological ramifications of the sewage spills suggest classification of 
‘environmental crime’, although their localised impact also is noteworthy in this 
regard. There is no other evidence of any significant impact of the war on water 
infrastructure, institutions, or resources in Israel. In addition, there is nothing to sug-
gest that the attacks were intended to conquer any of the Lebanese or Syrian land 
still occupied by Israel (Cheba’a Farms or Ghajar the Golan) or to secure the water that 
flows through it (Zeitoun et al., 2012)—thus there is nothing to suggest an apparent 
hydro-political motive or effect. 
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Water and war in Lebanon in 2006
The 2006 Summer War claimed the lives of around 1,100 Lebanese civilians and 
280–500 armed combatants, and injured 3,700 civilians and displaced more than 
900,000 people (Amnesty International, 2006; GoL, 2006a, 2006b). Israeli Air Force 
F-16s and other jets flew some 15,500 sorties, while the Israeli Navy fired more than 
2,500 shells at coastal targets and IDF ground artillery based in northern Israel fired 
thousands of rounds at South Lebanon. Anti-personnel cluster bombs were employed, 
whose dart-filled bomblets failed to explode in many cases, rendering in excess of 
500 farm fields inoperable (UNMACC, 2007; Darwish, Farajalla, and Masri, 2009). 
Power transmission lines and main roadways were also put out of service, while the 
runway at Beirut–Rafic Hariri International Airport and roughly 90 highway over-
passes and bridges were debilitated. Some 30,000 housing units were destroyed and 
more than 100,000 were damaged (UNHRL, 2006). Around 1,800 hectares of wood-
land were affected by forest fires and damage to the coastal oil reservoir at Jiyeh 
resulted in 12–15,000 tonnes of fuel flowing into the sea (UNDP, 2007, Table 6.1). 
 The direct damage is estimated at between USD 1.8 and 3.6 billion, and the oppor-
tunity cost at about USD 8 billion (GoL, 2006a, 2006b). While placing an economic 
value on ‘the environment’ is fraught with error, of course, the total economic cost 
of environmental damage has been estimated at USD 730 million—not including 
the cost to public health of degraded water quality (World Bank, 2007).
 As one would expect, water infrastructure and resources were not spared in the 
fighting. Table 3 contains a complete list of the damage to water infrastructure, institu-
tions, and resources, as well as to water-related livelihoods. The bulk of the data on 
water infrastructure and resources is from the South Lebanon Water Establishment 
(SLWE), with which one of the authors worked extensively as a United Nations (UN) 
employee to document the damage. This information is supplemented by reports 
from a number of UN agencies7 and by the direct observations of the authors, each 
of whom was involved in the reconstruction effort during and immediately follow-
ing the war.
 An understanding of the nature of the damage is necessary to gain a better under-
standing of the relationship between water and the 2006 Summer War, and serves to 
complement the application of the ‘analytical framework of water and armed conflict’.
Damage to water infrastructure and resources in Lebanon8
One result of the extensive damage documented in Table 3 was the disruption of the 
domestic water supply to dozens of villages in southern Lebanon, as well as in the 
Dahiya neighbourhood of Beirut. A United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 
Situation Report noted, for example, that ‘60 percent of towns and villages in South 
Lebanon are without regular water supplies due to infrastructure damage to the pipe 
network, lack of electricity to power the pumps, and destroyed or damaged roof 
water tanks’ (cited in USAID, 2006). In many cases, the water supply was inter-
rupted indirectly—that is, through damage to the electricity network (such as the 
destruction of hundreds of high-voltage transformers)—forcing the operators of water 
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Table 3. Damage to water infrastructure, resources, development efforts and hydro-
politics, Lebanon, 20069 
Item Area Comments Charactera Referencesb
Armed conflict and water infrastructure
Public water reservoirs South Fifty-five public water reservoirs 
partially or completely destroyed.
12 discriminate;  
43 indiscriminate
GoL, 2006a; 
SLWE, 2006
Public drinking water 
systems
Nabatieh Public wells. Indiscriminate UNDP, 2007, 
Ch. 9, p. 1
Taibe Pumping station captured and 
occupied by the IDF.
 Discriminate MDM, 2006
Wazzani Reservoir and pumps at the booster 
station partially destroyed.
 Discriminate GoL, 2006a; 
SLWE, 2006
Village-level pumps Lebanon Twenty pumps damaged or  
destroyed in villages.
Indiscriminate GoL, 2006a; 
SLWE, 2006; 
Allès, 2010
Artesian wells South Two artesian wells damaged. Indiscriminate GoL, 2006a; 
SLWE, 2006
Distribution networks Lebanon Destruction of numerous sections 
of village distribution networks 
through, inter alia, the use of 
bulldozers (witnessed in the case 
of Aita el Cha’ab).
Mainly indiscrimi-
nate (Aita el Cha’ab 
– discriminate) 
Sadeldeen, 
2009
Household infrastructure Lebanon Tens of thousands of household 
rooftop hot-water tanks penetrated 
by shrapnel or bullets.
Indiscriminate GoL, 2006a; 
SLWE, 2006
Power supply South Electrical transmission lines to 
and distribution lines within most 
villages (including to most well 
pumps) . Between 199 and 725 
high-voltage electrical transform-
ers destroyed. 
 Discriminate GoL, 2006a; 
SLWE, 2006; 
UNDP, 2006
Irrigation schemes West 
Beka’a
Qara’oun 
Parts of main irrigation canals 
destroyed.
 Discriminate UNDP, 2006
Qasmiyeh Parts of main irrigation canals 
destroyed.
 Discriminate  GoL, 2006a; 
SLWE, 2006
Armed conflict and water resources
Surface water and 
groundwater
Beka’a Contamination of groundwater by 
oil and fuel seepage from between 
22 and 47 damaged petrol stations. 
Petrol seepage into local ground-
water at at least five stations in 
the Beka’a Valley. 
UNDP, 2007
Lebanon Contamination of surface or ground-
water by damaged or destroyed 
industrial sites (heavy metals, 
volatile organics, for instance). 
Indiscriminate (UNDP, 2007, 
Ch. 9; UNEP, 
2007a)
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Item Area Comments Charactera Referencesb
Contamination of groundwater by 
seepage from between 199 and 
725 high-voltage electrical trans-
formers, many of which contained 
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs).
 
Fisheries/coast Lebanon/
coast
Damage from oil spill caused by 
the attack on the Jiyeh power 
plant. 
Discriminate
Indiscriminate
UNDP, 2007; 
UNEP, 2007a
Armed conflict and water-sector institutions/development
Dam works Beka’a Damages of equipment at the 
Hermel dam construction site on 
the Al Assi River in the Beka’a 
Valley. 
 Discriminate UNDP, 2007, 
Ch. 6, p. 10; 
UN-ESCWA 
and BGR, 
2012, Table 4
SLWE Saida The effort to coordinate and  
execute the reconstruction effort 
delays the water-sector reform 
plan of the newly established 
institution. 
Indiscriminate Personal com-
municationc
Fish farms Beka’a Several fish farms were directly 
hit and more than 50 per cent of 
annual production was destroyed 
(305 tons)—along tributaries of 
the Litani and Al Assi Rivers.
 Discriminate UNDP, 2007; 
UNEP, 2007a
Agriculture South Between 0.5 and 1.5 million un-
exploded cluster bomblets render 
more than 500 fields inaccessible.
 Discriminate, indis-
criminate
UNMACC, 
2007;  
Darwish, 
Farajalla, 
and Masri, 
2009
Armed conflict and trans-boundary water conflict/cooperation
Upper Jordan River  
conflict
South Minor damage to the Wazzani 
Pumping Station, the construc-
tion of which (in 2002) led to 
high tension between Israel and 
Lebanon, owing to the threat of 
alteration of the asymmetric use 
of the Hasbani tributary of the 
Jordan River. As discussed in the 
text, no hydro-political motive for 
the damage is apparent. 
Indiscriminate Zeitoun et 
al., 2013; 
Zeitoun,  
Talhami, and 
Eid-Sabbagh, 
2013
Al Assi/Orontes North Damage to the dam site on the 
tributaries of the Al Assi River 
might have affected the 2002 
Syria–Lebanon Treaty, although 
no significant impact has been 
observed. 
Indiscriminate
a Character here reflects the authors’ assessment, according to the definition of indiscriminate and dis-
criminate damage in the main text. 
b See also http://www.rebuildlebanon.gov.lb.
c Interview with Ahmad Nizam, the Director of the SLWE, Saida, Lebanon, 5 March 2011.
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pumps to use back-up diesel electricity generators. Diesel fuel for generators, however, 
is also a link in the water-supply chain, and was in short supply because of damage to 
the roads, the destruction of fuel stations, and fear of personal injury during delivery 
of relief fuel.
 Direct damage to water infrastructure was the product of tank traffic, light-arms 
shrapnel, or fire from rifles, tanks, and fighter jets. It took the form of partially or com-
pletely destroyed water pumping stations, transmission mainlines and distribution 
network lines, pumps for elevated reservoirs, networks within villages, underground 
household rainwater catchment cisterns, pumps to convey water to rooftop reser-
voirs, household rooftop reservoirs, and larger municipal water reservoirs.10 Most 
of the damage to pipelines and roof tanks appears in general to have been ‘indis-
criminate’, in the sense that it was the outcome of shelling of neighbourhoods for 
military purposes. The damage to public water reservoirs and to the Wazzani pump-
ing station warrant closer attention (see below). 
 The war also affected the SLWE, which had been established just one year prior to 
the war. The crisis for which the new institution found itself responsible halted the 
sector reforms that were under way, for the entire recovery and reconstruction 
period (Allès, 2010). The cost to the SLWE of providing alternative sources of water 
and of repairing the damaged infrastructure has been estimated at USD 130 million 
(World Bank, 2007), while SLWE operations were also caught up directly and indi-
rectly in the internal political tensions that ensued from the war11 (Allès, 2007, 2010). 
 The post-war environmental assessments prepared by UNEP (2007a) and the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2007) highlight a number of threats to 
and impacts on the environment, specifically water resources. The lack of baseline 
data makes it difficult to gauge their significance, though, and it is a complex task to 
distinguish between war-induced and chronic sources of pollution of water resources. 
 The most obvious harmful environmental effects of the war—notwithstanding the 
Jiyeh oil spill—are considered to originate from damaged and destroyed industrial 
sites, damaged petrol stations, and damaged electricity transformers.12 Groundwater13 
was particularly vulnerable to the effects of oil and fuel seepage from damaged petrol 
stations (estimated to number between 22 and 47 in South Lebanon and the Beka’a 
Valley). The risk of contamination was believed to be highest in the Beka’a Valley, 
because of the aquitard and other structures in the Eocene geological substrata.14 The 
destruction of roughly 200–700 high-voltage electricity transformers also posed a 
particular risk because of the potential seepage into the groundwater of polychlorinated 
biphenyls (PCBs) (UNDP, 2007, Table 1 and ch. 9, p. 5). The carcinogenic com-
pounds have a very long retention time, spreading the risk to future generations, and 
contravening the norms being developed by ecocide and environmental justice. 
 No information on damage of WTPs—in terms of released sludge or biogas owing 
to the fleeing of maintenance teams, as occurred in Israel—has been documented. 
It is reasonable to assume, though, that this type of damage was minor in relation to 
that suffered south of the border (since there are fewer large WTPs), as well as to 
the rest of the damage in Lebanon. 
The analytical framework of water and armed conflict 35
Figure 1. IDF-related damage to public water reservoirs in Lebanon during the 2006 war
Damage to public water reservoirs and the impact on the Jordan River 
conflict 
The most visible impact of the war was on public water reservoirs. The distribution 
of damaged water reservoirs (see Figure 1) reflects the level of fighting.15 The nature 
of the damage to the reservoirs varies, as Médecins du Monde (MDM, 2006, p. 30) notes: 
Water supply through the public water networks ceased from the outbreak of the conflict. 
Where the municipal reservoirs were elevated, they were usually damaged by bombing. 
It is difficult to establish whether the damage was deliberate, as in some cases even their 
highly visible position far from the village suggests the acts were intentional. In the rare 
 
Notes: the towns in bold are discussed in the text. Villages listed that did not suffer damage to reser-
voirs experienced mild-to-severe damage to other infrastructure.
Source: Zeitoun et al. (2012). 
Mark Zeitoun, Karim Eid-Sabbagh, and Jeremy Loveless 36 
Figure 2. Sample of water reservoirs in Lebanon that suffered different types of damage 
during the 2006 war              
c) Ramiya reservoir: ‘discriminate’
a) Siddiquine reservoir: 
no direct damage to reservoir    
b) Chama’a reservoir:  
‘indiscriminate’ and ‘discriminate’
Source: authors.
cases where reservoirs were spared from damage, or were buried, it was the water distribu-
tion networks under bombed roads that were damaged (translation by the authors).
 A closer look at the three reservoirs shown in Figure 2 provides further insight 
into the character of the damage. The elevated reservoir in Siddiquine is typical of the 
design of water towers in the region. It is located on the village limits right beside its 
feeder well, and it remained intact even as the village centre was struck by Israeli 
artillery and air strikes. Any direct damage to the reservoir is superficial (due to 
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shrapnel), and can be classified as indiscriminate. However, the water supply of resi-
dents who remained in the town ceased because of damage to the electrical mains 
that powered the pump feeding the reservoir. The new mobile electricity generator 
shown in the photograph is a replacement of the original backup generator that was 
decommissioned by the same shrapnel (and in any case probably had not been main-
tained adequately). The water supply to the villagers was interrupted therefore without 
direct damage to the water storage infrastructure. Once the fighting had stopped and 
the security of rehabilitation crews was assured, the backup generator was replaced 
and the well and reservoir quickly became functional. 
 The Chama’a reservoir was hit by multiple types of projectiles, shrapnel, bullets, 
and at least one tank or fixed artillery round. The nature of the damage reflects the 
reservoir’s highly exposed location: on the edge of the town at the top of a hill that 
overlooks a valley marking the northern border of Israel. The damage inflicted may 
be classed as either indiscriminate or discriminate, depending on whether the reser-
voir was used by combatants as a vantage point or to store weapons.16 No quick res-
toration of the reservoir was possible, necessitating the construction of temporary 
‘Oxfam’ water tanks to restore partially water delivery services to the town, along 
with the delivery of a temporary diesel electricity generator. 
 Unlike the two previous examples, the Ramiya reservoir sits on the ground on 
a hill, slightly removed from the village. It does not show the same signs of intense 
fighting or shelling, but it suffered three very targeted higher-calibre hits, probably 
tank shells. The town’s other public reservoir (which is elevated) was also very heav-
ily damaged. As with the Chama’a reservoir, the damage may be judged to be both 
indiscriminate and discriminate. Water delivery could only be restored in part after 
the cessation of hostilities through the construction of a temporary reservoir and 
power supply. 
 The least visible impact of the war was on the politics of the Upper Jordan River 
conflict, which may be explored by examining the elevated reservoir of the booster 
station of the Wazzani Pumping Station (see Figure 3). The reservoir suffered appar-
ently targeted structural damage, while the pump, the electricity supply, and the 
underground transmission pipes of the pumping station itself were damaged to a 
lesser degree (Zeitoun et al., 2012). Damage to this municipal reservoir raises the ques-
tion of ulterior (hydro) political motives, as its construction by the Government of 
Lebanon in 2002 nearly sparked a war itself—known as the Wazzani Springs dis-
pute (Maternowski, 2006; Allès, 2007). The construction was a challenge to the 
inequitable sharing of the flows that had been established by Israel in 1964 (Amery, 
2000; Zeitoun et al., 2013).
 An unconsidered interpretation of the motives behind the damage would suggest 
that it was inflicted by the IDF to prevent further abstractions from the Springs—
which the Government of Israel failed to do through diplomacy in 2002. The partial 
destruction of the reservoir indeed interrupted the water supply to villages fed by 
the pumping station, but left the object of the 2002 water conflict—the abstraction 
pumps—relatively intact. The damage to the reservoir (and to the pumping station 
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itself ) was less severe than that to many 
of the other reservoirs, although it would 
have been a simple task for the Israeli Air 
Force or ground troops to put the abstrac-
tion pumps out of commission. At the end 
of the war, the minor structural damage 
was repaired, and the pumping station 
resumed operations some months later. 
 The extent of the damage caused to the 
Wazzani reservoir suggests that, whether 
targeted or indiscriminate, it was not 
intended to stop Lebanese long-term water 
withdrawals, and thus was not directly 
linked to the Israel–Lebanon conflict over 
the Upper Jordan River. The Govern-
ment of Lebanon has not attempted any 
further development of the river since 
2002, suggesting that the 2006 attacks have 
served to shore-up ‘remote control’ of 
the trans-boundary resource, by pre-empting any further Lebanese development 
(Zeitoun et al., 2013). 
Discussion: violations of international law and norms
The discriminate or indiscriminate damage by the Government of Israel of more than 
50 Lebanese public water reservoirs begs the question whether it was part of official 
army policy. Reflecting on the subject, Israeli academic Hillel Shuval proposes that 
the blame resides with individual soldiers: ‘It was not a war tactic but rather disgraceful 
acts by soldiers as an act of vengeance or retaliation to attacks around these infra-
structures’ (original emphasis). The viewpoint is supported by a statement from an 
Israeli spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: ‘there’s a policy decision at 
the highest level not to target those water pumping stations’ (Murphy 2006). Having 
dealt with previous damage during the Israeli invasions in 1993 and 1996, however, 
Ahmad Nizam, the Director of the SLWE, asked how the damage could be anything 
but targeted, whether or not it was official military policy.17 
 In any case, the destruction of such vital services is a well-known method of clear-
ing civilians during fighting, and of preventing or delaying their return to their 
homes. The damage to the reservoirs and to the rest of the water infrastructure is 
also clearly a violation of IHL (which calls for the protection of the ‘natural envi-
ronment’ and of ‘objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population’). 
In addition, the disruption of water services plainly breaches the right to water (as 
detailed in the ICESCR and UNGA Resolution A/RES/64/292), and is an issue of 
access that may result in a deep sense of injustice, and calls for retribution. 
Figure 3. Wazzani Pumping Station 
Reservoir 
Source: authors.
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 Classification of the damage inflicted on groundwater in Lebanon as an ‘environ-
mental crime’ would require further investigation of the effect on wider ecosystems. 
The long-term nature of some damage certainly invokes, and could be expected to 
be perceived as, environmental injustice. The damage to rural water-based liveli-
hoods would seemingly illicit a similar sense of injustice, and along with the damage 
to water institutions in Lebanon, is a setback for the state in meeting its MDGs. The 
limited Israeli damage to the Wazzani Pumping Station has been interpreted as 
mildly reinforcing asymmetric distribution of control over the Upper Jordan River, 
which thus remains in contravention of the IWL principle of ‘equitable and reason-
able’ use. It also suggests no hydro-political motive for the war. 
Conclusion
Gregory (2010, p. 154) emphasises how ‘new’ wars may be cast as ‘surgical, sensitive, 
and scrupulous’. The evidence of destruction of civilian infrastructure—let alone 
civilian causalities—reveals that there was nothing ‘new’ about the 2006 Summer 
War. It was evidently indiscriminate, callous, and predatory, as most wars tend to be. 
The relationship demonstrates less of the rich reproductive tendencies reviewed by 
Pearson (2012) than a uni-directional impact of war on water (infrastructure, insti-
tutions, politics, and resources). This may not be the case in more protracted armed 
conflicts (such as Iraq), or in drier (such as Libya) or wetter (such as Sri Lanka) climes. 
 Application of the ‘analytical framework of water and armed conflict’ has revealed 
some of its methodological and analytical weaknesses. A judgement of the character 
of the damage can tend towards subjectivity, among other things, and is best handled 
by combat and munitions experts familiar with the military engagement (as was the 
case with the UN Human Rights Council’s investigation into the 2008–09 offen-
sive in Gaza) (UNHRC, 2009). In addition, given the very wide range of short- and 
long-term direct and indirect links between armed conflict and the environment, 
the lack of solid pre-war environmental baselines also weakens the utility of post-
war assessments. Here, the call of Machlis and Hanson (2008) for deeper ecological 
investigations at all stages rings true, even if they are not likely to be high on any 
government’s policy priority list. Furthermore, although the authors have benefit-
ted from their personal experience of the case at hand, the data-collection methods 
are difficult to replicate. Perhaps most importantly, the tallying of damage is very 
distant from the human cost of war, and while debates rage over its enduring effect 
on ecology, this research approach does little to address directly the mental and the 
physical health of future generations. Subsequent examinations of the relationship 
between water and armed conflict would do well to gauge the impact—direct and 
cumulative—on people. 
 Nevertheless, the framework has served to broaden and deepen existing methods 
to explore the water–war relationship, identifying explicitly the nature of acts of 
war (indiscriminate or discriminate), and grounding them in international water norms 
and law. The framework can be used as well to provide the empirical evidence 
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required to refine and reinforce the international environmental legal framework. 
Here, the environmental activist forces (including those developing the laws to crim-
inalise ‘ecocide’) and the physical scientists advocating warfare ecology may combine 
with the international law community to develop rules of war, as well as interna-
tional norms during periods of non-war. 
 A role for international humanitarian organisations at every stage of an armed 
conflict also is identified. Budget constraints make the establishment of environ-
mental baselines prior to a war very difficult to justify, although the capacity to 
document damage before, during, and after hostilities exists. Its execution by water 
and sanitation engineers and project managers would aid progressive social agendas 
aimed at protecting all aspects of water/environment/people in future armed con-
flicts. And the now well-established post-conflict environmental damage assessments 
could be assisted by the framework’s anchoring of international environmental and 
water norms and laws. While a cynical view of the efficacy and enforceability of 
international norms and law might judge such efforts as futile, their contribution 
through norm-building and ‘soft law’ should not be discounted. 
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Endnotes
1 Adopted on 8 June 1977, as an addition to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
2 See also General Comment 15 of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights (http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/a5458d1d1bbd713fc1256cc400389e94).
3 The growing literature on ‘urbicide’ goes somewhat further in examining the impact of armed 
conflict on infrastructure, by analysing the reasons behind patterns of destruction of the built envi-
ronment (Coward, 2008).
4 Machlis and Hanson (2008, Table 1) expand the scale of examination to consider the impact of war 
on the local landscape and on regional and global ecosystems.
5 A more helpful definition could be: ‘Water terrorism (state and non-state actors) – where water 
resources or water systems are employed as either targets or tools to create fear and panic in the 
opponent’s civilian population’.
6 Improvements and modifications based on experience of other wars is welcome. 
7 Nonetheless, the full extent of the damage cannot be ascertained with great certainty, as it was not 
documented in a standardised or systematic way. 
8 This stocktaking of damage does not include air and soil pollution owing to increased quarrying 
activity to support the reconstruction, forest fires, or the Jiyeh oil spill.
9 Damage in Beirut and undocumented damage is not included. Only damage that has been docu-
mented and can be referenced is listed here, although the authors acknowledge the existence of 
considerable undocumented damage, particularly in Beirut. 
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10 As coordinator of water and sanitation relief efforts, UNICEF compiled an incomplete list of dam-
age to water infrastructure (available on request from the authors). 
11 The reconstruction effort saw several political factions and other groups engage in classic post-
war distributive politics, something relatively well-documented by government ministries and 
international aid agencies (Eid-Sabbagh, 2007; Darwish, Farajalla, and Masri, 2009; Hamieh and 
Mac Ginty, 2010).
12 The soil of the Choueifat industrial area, for example, was contaminated by the ash fall-out result-
ing from damage to 13 sub-plots, including the Transmed compound that stored lead batteries 
and household cleaning products, which was hit by a ‘bunker buster’ (UNDP, 2007, Ch. 9, p. 1).
13 Surface water was also contaminated. Heavy metals and volatile organics were found in the Ghadir 
stream, complementing BOD (biological oxygen demand) and COD (chemical oxygen demand) 
readings that were between two and seven times more than the regulatory limits (UNEP, 2007a, 
pp. 118–125).
14 The karst limestone aquifer predominant throughout South Lebanon (including in the Hasbani/
Wazzani basin, the flashpoint of hydro-politics as will be shown below) is more resilient to benzene 
seepage, as toxins would be flushed away relatively easily by winter rains (UNDP, 2007, p. 96).
15 Establishing patterns between the extent of the destruction of all civilian infrastructure (includ-
ing bridges and houses) and the destruction of the public water reservoirs in particular is difficult. 
Not all of the damaged reservoirs were located in villages that saw heavy fighting. The reservoir 
in Aalmane was destroyed, for example, although ‘only’ three houses were destroyed or severely 
damaged in the village. Most of the damaged reservoirs appear to be situated in villages where 
the general level of destruction was high, and which witnessed ground fighting on a more or less 
intense scale (the reservoirs in Ba’albeck and Haret el Saida excepted). Around 60 reservoirs that 
were in the line of fire were not touched.
16 We consider the use of the reservoir in this manner to be unlikely, given the stealth nature of the fight-
ing, but a definitive conclusion requires much further investigation of the nature of the hostilities.
17 Interview with the authors, Saida, Lebanon, 5 March 2011. 
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